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Background: On 8 May 2018, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported an 13 
outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Equateur Province in the northwest of the country. The remoteness of 14 
most affected communities and the involvement of an urban centre connected to the capital city and 15 
neighbouring countries makes this outbreak the most complex and high risk ever experienced by the DRC.   16 
 17 
Methods:  Epidemiological investigations of cases were conducted to obtain demographic characteristics, 18 
determine possible exposures, collect information about signs and symptoms, and identify contacts to be 19 
followed up for 21 days. Cases were classified as suspected, probable or confirmed case using the national EVD 20 
case definitions. The reproduction number and projected number of cases for the four week period 25 May to 21 
21 June were estimated.  22 
 23 
Results: Update as of 30 May, 50 cases (37 confirmed, 13 probable) of Zaire ebolavirus, were reported across 24 
Bikoro (42% of cases), Iboko (50% of cases) and Wangata (8% of cases) health zones. Wangata is part of 25 
Mbandaka, the urban capital of Equateur Province connected to major national and international transport 26 
routes. By 30 May, 25 deaths had been reported, giving a case fatality ratio (CFR) of 56% (95% CI: 39% - 72%) 27 
after adjustment for censoring. This CFR is consistent (p=0.427) with estimates for the 2013-15 West African 28 
epidemic. The median age of cases was 40 years (range: 8-80 years) and 30 (60%) were male. The most common 29 
reported signs and symptoms included fever (95%), fatigue (90%) and loss of appetite (90%). Gastrointestinal 30 
symptoms were common and 32% cases reported haemorrhagic signs. Time from illness onset or hospitalisation 31 
to specimen testing decreased over time.  On 30 May, 734 contacts had been identified, of which 69% had been 32 
followed up. The estimated reproduction number is 1.03 (95%CI 0.83–1.37) and the cumulative case incidence 33 
for the outbreak by 21 June is projected to be 78 cases (95% CI: 37 to 281). The initial source of the outbreak is 34 
still under investigation.    35 
 36 
Conclusions:  37 
The current Ebola virus outbreak has similar epidemiological features to previous Ebola outbreaks.  Rapid case 38 
isolation, contact tracing and the ongoing vaccination programme is expected to stop the outbreak.  The 39 
forecast of the number of cases does not exceed the current capacity to respond, if the epidemiological 40 
situation does not change.  41 
42 
Introduction 43 
On 3 May 2018, the Ministry of Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) received a notification 44 
from the Health Division of Equateur Province of 21 cases of fever with haemorrhagic signs, including 17 45 
community deaths, from the Ikoko Impenge Health Area, Bikoro Health Zone, which is approximately 125 km 46 
south of the provincial capital of Mbandaka. An investigation team, composed of members of the Ministry of 47 
Health, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), travelled to Bikoro Health 48 
Zone from 5 to 6 May 2018. Blood samples were collected from five hospitalised cases and transported to the 49 
National Institute of Biological Research (INRB) in Kinshasa for laboratory testing on 6 May 2018. Of these, two 50 
were positive for Zaire ebolavirus by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). In line with the 51 
International Health Regulation (IHR) requirements, the Ministry of Health notified WHO of the confirmed cases 52 
and declared the outbreak on 8 May 2018. Further investigation found cases in neighbouring Wangata and 53 
Iboko health zones.  54 
 55 
Ebola virus is a filovirus with five sub-species (Zaire, Bundibugyo, Sudan, Reston and Taï Forest). It causes Ebola 56 
virus disease (EVD) which has a case fatality ratio (CFR) of between 25% and 90%1. The Zaire strain is the most 57 
fatal with an overall CFR ranging from 69% to 88%2. EVD is transmitted primarily through contact with the body 58 
fluids of symptomatic patients, most commonly to adults of 17-44 years, with relative sparing of children under 59 
the age of 16 years3,4,5,6. Transmission can be stopped by early diagnosis, patient isolation and care, infection 60 
control, safe and dignified burial of the remains of cases, rigorous tracing of contacts and more recently, 61 
targeted vaccination.  62 
 63 
DRC has recorded eight previous EVD outbreaks since 1976 (Figure 1)7,8. The last outbreak occurred in May 2017 64 
in a remote area in the north-east of the country, Likati Health Zone in the Bas-Uele Province, causing a total of 65 
eight cases with four deaths.  Most of the previous outbreaks have been confined to remote rural areas with the 66 
exception an outbreak in Kikwit, a town with a population of just under 400,000 that resulted in 315 cases and 67 
250 deaths9.  The response to this outbreak includes use of traditional measures such as early identification, 68 
isolation and care of cases, contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, culturally appropriate community 69 
mobilisation. These traditional measures are being supplemented by use of the recombinant vesicular stomatitis 70 
virus–Zaire Ebola virus (rVSV-ZEBOV) vaccine, with vaccination of first and second line contacts. This paper is the 71 
first in a series on the latest outbreak in DRC. It provides an early overview of the descriptive epidemiology using 72 
best data available from field teams working to response to the epidemic.   73 
Methods  74 
Case investigation: Cases were classified as suspected, probable or confirmed according to the EVD case 75 
definitions of the Ministry of Health (Table 1 below)10. Confirmation of cases required detection of Ebola RNA in 76 
blood or body fluids by RT-PCR. Information on all cases was recorded using the Ministry of Health case 77 
investigation form and entered into an electronic database. Case investigations were conducted to record 78 
demographic characteristics, determine possible exposures, document information on illness onset and signs 79 
and symptoms, and to identify potentially exposed contacts. For cases who had recovered or died before 5 May 80 
2018, retrospective case classification was through review of medical records at health facilities in the affected 81 
locations.  For cases alive or newly ill since declaration of the outbreak, information was collected prospectively 82 
at the time of case investigation. Our analysis included probable and confirmed cases as of 30 May 2018. 83 
 84 
Contact tracing: Contacts were identified during the case investigation process for each case. Contact tracers are 85 
required to visit all contacts once a day (in Mbandaka city, contacts are visited twice daily)  for 21 days following 86 
the last date of contact with an infectious suspected, probable or confirmed case. Information on their health 87 
status and the development of any EVD like symptoms  is collected11.   88 
 89 
Data analysis: Data analyses were performed using R (version 4.3). Missing/unknown data were excluded. 90 
Confidence intervals were calculated assuming symptom occurrence was binomially distributed. Spatial 91 
locations of cases were analysed in ArcGIS (ESRI, version 10.5) using area boundaries developed by a range of 92 
partners, including WHO, in consultation with the Ministry of Health. Cases were plotted to village, health area 93 
and overall health zone in Bikoro, Iboko and Wangata, respectively. Boundaries are subject to confirmation. 94 
 95 
Case fatality ratio: The observed deaths by 30 May were used to obtain a naïve CFR estimate, which was then 96 
adjusted by the proportion of deaths among the cases in the database that would have been expected by 30 97 
May 2018, based on their dates of illness onset and the illness-onset-to-death delay distribution estimated using 98 
the data from the West African Ebola epidemic5. In addition, the age-dependent CFR12  and illness-onset-to-99 
death distributions5 from the West African Epidemic were used to predict the numbers of deaths expected 100 
among the cases in the current outbreak by 30 May, based solely on the ages of cases and dates of illness onset. 101 
This predicted number of deaths was compared with the observed number of deaths by 30 May by calculating 102 
the two-sided p-value, 2×Poisson( X ≤ x | λ ) where x is the observed number of deaths by 30 May and λ is the 103 
predicted number of deaths by 30 May. 104 
 105 
Time from Illness onset to first hospitalisation and sample testing were calculated for cases with available data 106 
and with dates of onset after 30 April, in line with the “trusted period” defined with the reproduction number 107 
estimates. A simple linear regression was fitted against dates of case illness onset or hospitalisation to assess 108 
trends over time.  109 
 110 
Reproduction number estimates: Due to the delay between illness onset and notification, the most recent cases 111 
are likely not yet reported. Based on the confirmed cases only, we defined a “trusted period” where we 112 
estimated that the recorded incidence of confirmed cases with dates of illness onset between 30 April and 24 113 
May (inclusive) were at least 95% complete (potentially relative to an unknown but constant level of overall 114 
under-reporting). The analyses of the reproduction number (R) and onward projections were therefore based 115 
only on the confirmed cases with illness onset during this period (Annex 2). The analysis used an approach 116 
similar to those previously described12,13 , using a Poisson process or renewal equation to approximate the daily 117 
incidence and assumed: i) a serial interval distribution inferred for the West African Ebola Epidemic6 (Annex 1: 118 
Figure A3); and ii) constant transmissibility throughout the trusted period. 119 
 120 
Forward Projections: Using the estimates of the reproduction number obtained above, we projected incidence 121 
for the 4-week period, 25 May to 21 June, following the end of the trusted period (Annex 1). Those forward 122 
projections assumed that transmissibility and reporting rates remained the same as during the trusted period. 123 
Two transmission assumptions were explored: i) homogeneous transmission among cases (no super-spreading) 124 
approximated using a Poisson process and ii) heterogeneous transmission among cases (with super-spreading) 125 
using a negative binomial distribution which incorporates additional variability in the number of secondary cases. 126 
This level of heterogeneity was assumed to be similar to that seen during the West African Ebola epidemic6. 127 
 128 
95% Credible Intervals: The reproduction number estimates and the forward projections were estimated in a 129 
Bayesian framework using an MCMC (Monte Carlo Markov Chain) approach. Therefore, the uncertainty is 130 
reported here as 95% credible intervals (95% CI), obtained by taking the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the 131 
posterior distribution. 132 
 133 
  134 
Results  135 
As of 30 May 2018, a total of 50 EVD cases (37 confirmed, 13 probable), including 25 deaths (unadjusted CFR of 136 
50% [95% CI: 36% - 64%] by 30 May), have been identified in Equateur Province, with illness onsets of the cases 137 
between 5 April and 28 May (Figure 2). After adjustment for censoring, the CFR is 56% (95% CI: 39% - 72%), 138 
ignoring uncertainty in the illness-onset-to-death distribution. Based on the recorded ages of cases in the 139 
current outbreak, their recorded dates of illness onset, and epidemiological parameters estimated from the 140 
West African Ebola epidemic9, we would have expected 29.9 deaths by 30 May 2018, with a total of 33.0 deaths 141 
eventually expected among these 50 cases.  Thus, the fatalities seen in the current outbreak by 30 May are, 142 
after adjustment for censoring, consistent with CFR estimates seen in the West African Ebola epidemic (p-value 143 
= 0.427)9. The median age of cases was 40 years (range: 8–80 years) and 30 (60%) were male (Figure 3). Cases 144 
were reported in northern areas of Iboko (n=25; 23 confirmed, two probable), southern areas of Bikoro (n=21; 145 
10 confirmed, 11 probable) and Wangata (n=4; all confirmed) health zones (Figure 4).  146 
 147 
Of 50 confirmed and probable cases, 45 had at least one reported symptom. The most frequently reported 148 
symptoms were: fever (n=40/42), loss of appetite (n=37/ 41) and intense general fatigue (n=37/ 41), followed by 149 
diarrhoea (n=23/32), abdominal pain (n=22/ 35) and nausea/vomiting (n=22/35) (Figure 5). Haemorrhagic signs 150 
were observed in 14 of 43 cases. The symptom profile of confirmed and probable cases was statistically similar. 151 
The overall median time from illness onset to first hospitalisation was 1 day (range: 0–10 days) with  no evidence 152 
of a reduction over time (, p=0.54) (Figure 6). However, marked reductions in the time from illness onset to 153 
specimen sampling (data not shown) and illness onset to sample testing were apparent (p<0.0001, overall 154 
median 6 days, range 1–13 days). Similarly, time from first hospitalization to sample testing improved over time 155 
(p=0.0004, overall median 11 days, range 0–13 days). 156 
 157 
Five health care workers, two of whom died, were among the cases.  Other commonly affected occupational 158 
groups included farmers (n=14), students (n=5), household workers (n=5) and religious leaders (n=4). The most 159 
common exposure risks were having contact with another sick person (29 of 41 cases) and participation in a 160 
funeral (24 of 40 cases) (Table 2). 161 
As of 30 May, 1458 epidemiological contacts had been identified of which 746 remained under active follow-up. 162 
Of the 504 first and second line contacts eligible for vaccination, 496 had been vaccinated by teams of trained 163 
vaccinators.   164 
 165 
The estimated reproduction number in the period 30 April to 24 May was 1.03 (95% confidence interval (CI): 166 
0.83 to 1.37), an estimate that was robust to assumptions about the serial interval distribution and the trusted 167 
period.  The projected cumulative number of confirmed cases on 21 June 2018 is on average 76 (95% CI: 54 - 109) 168 
assuming a homogeneous transmissibility (Poisson) model, and 78 (95% CI: 37 to 281) assuming a 169 
heterogeneous transmissibility (negative binomial) model. The resulting projected incidence patterns are shown 170 
in Figure 7.   171 
Discussion:   172 
Our analysis shows that the epidemiological features of the current outbreak in DRC such as demographic 173 
characteristics and signs and symptoms of cases are consistent with previous outbreaks of EVD14,15,16.  Contact 174 
with other cases and participation in a funeral are the most commonly reported exposures among cases, similar 175 
to previous EVD outbreaks, reinforcing the importance of community engagement and implementation of safe 176 
and dignified burials for outbreak control.  The CFR is similar to that seen in previous outbreaks in DRC and 177 
elsewhere, but higher than was seen towards the end of the 2014-2016 West Africa outbreak, where there was 178 
greater access to Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs)13,17.  With the rapid installation of ETUs in the affected areas, the 179 
CFR is expected to decrease18,19,20 The reduction in the time from illness onset to isolation and testing is 180 
encouraging because prompt isolation and testing minimizes exposure and transmission of Ebola virus to other 181 
people.  It is concerning that five of 50 cases are health care workers, again highlighting the risk for clinical staff 182 
and the importance of providing sufficient training and equipment for health care workers to protect themselves.  183 
Moreover, that nearly half of the cases reported hospitalization or contact with a hospitalized patient prior to 184 
their Ebola infection is a clear reminder that health care facilities with inadequate infection control procedures 185 
can amplify Ebola outbreaks 5,21,22,23,24.  186 
The EVD outbreak in DRC currently remains geographically limited to three health zones in Equateur Province. 187 
Two of the affected communities are in remote areas, which whilst reducing the risk of widespread expansion of 188 
the outbreak, creates serious logistical barriers for a rapid response including the follow up of contacts each day. 189 
The response teams have had to overcome major infrastructure challenges in multiple sites across a wide 190 
geographic area, such as the lack of electricity for essential laboratory and clinical equipment, absence of 191 
communications networks for transmitting data, very limited road access for contact tracers to travel on, and 192 
absence of accommodation for responders. The complexity of the context also makes it extremely difficult to 193 
collate and analyse epidemiological and response data for analysis and operational planning.  In addition to 194 
these challenges, the spread of transmission to the provincial capital, Mbandaka, an urban area of nearly one 195 
million people, raises concerns about an urban Ebola outbreak.  Even more concerning is that Mbandaka is a 196 
port city on the Congo River and is a major transportation hub – to the capital Kinshasa with nearly 10 million 197 
inhabitants, and also to neighbouring countries such as the Republic of the Congo and the Central African 198 
Republic.  The proximity of this outbreak to major national and international transportation routes underpins 199 
WHO`s assessment that the public health risk from this outbreak is very high for DRC and high for other 200 
neighbouring countries.  The risk internationally remains low 25.   201 
At present the source of the outbreak is unknown. Investigations are ongoing, but one hypothesis is that this 202 
outbreak is linked to a cluster reported in February 2018 of 15 persons who had a febrile illness that occurred in 203 
Ingende and Bikoro health zones of Equateur Province. Of those 15 cases, 11 had haemorrhagic signs, of whom 204 
eight died. According to the investigation report, the first case died on 20 December 2017. The aetiology of that 205 
cluster has not been confirmed. While a link between the two clusters cannot be ruled out, the long period of 206 
time between these two events without identified chains of transmission calls into question whether they were 207 
causally linked. However, there are epidemiological links between the ongoing clusters in the different locations, 208 
which underscores the potential for geographic spread, even in remote areas. Ongoing field investigations are 209 
being conducted to describe the chains of transmission that link the identified cases and information on 210 
transmission chains will be published online as it becomes available. In addition, further information on contact 211 
tracing and the proportion of cases emerging from contact lists will also be made available.  212 
Statistical forward projections suggest that if interventions remain as effective as they were between 30 April 213 
and 24 May, possibly twice as many cases may occur by 21 June.  Even under this pessimistic scenario, the 214 
current isolation capacity available in the affected communities would be sufficient. Nonetheless, considering 215 
that a period of 42 days after the last cases is required before the outbreak can be considered over, the ongoing 216 
occurrence of cases would mean that the response will need to continue for at least the next three months or 217 
more.   Furthermore, is not possible to rule out further expansion of the outbreak if there is exportation of cases 218 
to new areas or if there are ongoing but hitherto unrecognized chains of transmission. It is also possible that a 219 
new chain of transmission may occur following sexual transmission of the virus from a male survivor, if 220 
appropriate services and counselling are not provided, again requiring an even longer response.   221 
As for all outbreak investigations, some data are collected retrospectively and some data are incomplete.  Data 222 
on signs and symptoms for some patients were collected retrospectively from medical records, which may have 223 
resulted in errors or missing data.  An analysis of a subset of patients with prospectively collected data results in 224 
a similar frequency of signs and symptoms. Detailed information about chains of transmission is being compiled 225 
by field investigation teams and are not available currently. The dynamic nature of outbreaks and response 226 
means that some numbers are revised as additional information becomes available. 227 
A major sustained response is therefore needed to ensure ongoing case identification, contact tracing, isolation, 228 
and other control measures. Implementation of WHO`s Early Warning Alert and Response System, (EWARS), a 229 
data collection system that uses handheld devices, represents a major improvement for data collection 230 
compared with the 2014-2016 West Africa outbreak.  However, this information system is not optimally 231 
designed for contact tracing.  Collecting, managing, and analysing epidemiological data in real-time continues to 232 
be a significant challenge in the field. Nonetheless, the analysis presented in this paper shows that real-time 233 
data collection and epidemiological analysis for the control of complex Ebola outbreaks is achievable.  234 
The epidemiology of the current Ebola virus outbreak in DRC has similar features to previous Ebola outbreaks, 235 
which indicates that early detection of the outbreak combined with tried-and-tested interventions including  236 
early isolation and treatment, contact tracing, safe burials and community engagement currently being 237 
implemented, along with the additional benefit of targeted vaccination, should be sufficient to control this 238 
outbreak.  However the combination of remote communities and spread to an urban centre that is connected to 239 
the capital city and neighbouring countries, makes this outbreak the most complex and high risk ever 240 
experienced by the DRC.   241 
242 
Tables and figures: 243 
Figure 1: Previous outbreaks of Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1976–2018. 244 
Boundaries are subject to confirmation and locations are approximate. The boundaries and names shown and 245 
the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the 246 
World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, 247 
or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent 248 
approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.  249 
  250 
Table 1: Ebola Virus Disease Case and contact definitions.  251 
Suspected case 
 
Any living person having or having had a high fever with a sudden onset, with an 
epidemiological link to: 
• a suspected, probable or confirmed case of Ebola 
• a dead or sick animal OR  
Any deceased person having or having had a high fever with a sudden onset, and who has 
been in contact with: 
• a suspected or probable case of Ebola 
• a dead or sick animal OR  
Anyone with a high fever with a sudden onset and at least three of the following symptoms: 
headache, severe fatigue, anorexia / loss of appetite, difficulty swallowing, abdominal pain, 
difficulty breathing, vomiting, hiccups, diarrhoea; muscle or joint pain OR 
Anyone with unexplained bleeding; OR 
Anyone with sudden and unexplained death 
Probable case 
 
Any suspected case evaluated by a clinician; OR 
Any suspect case that has died (and for which it has not been possible to obtain biological 
samples for laboratory confirmation) with an epidemiological link to a confirmed case 
 
Confirmed case  
 
Any suspected or probable case with a positive laboratory result for viral RNA by reverse 
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), or for retrospective 
diagnosis, antibodies against Ebola. 
Contacts  Any person having had contact with a confirmed, probable or suspected EVD case by: 
• sleeping in the same house as the case in the month before illness onset 
• Having direct physical contact during the cases illness or with the body of a 
deceased case 
• Having shared the same transport vehicle as a case during their illness 
• Having touched any bodily fluids of a case during their illness 
• Having handled any clothes or linen of a case during their illness 
• Having been breastfed by a case. 
252 
Figure 2: Confirmed and probable EVD cases by date of illness onset and classification, Democratic Republic of 253 
the Congo, data as of 30 May 2018 (n=50) 254 
 255 
 256 
Figure 3: Confirmed and probable EVD cases by age and sex, Democratic Republic of the Congo, data as of 30 257 
May 2018 (n=49). Age was unknown for n=1 female case.                         258 
 259 
  260 
Figure 4: Confirmed and probable Ebola virus disease cases by approximate place of residence, Democratic 261 
Republic of the Congo, reported as of the 30 May 2018. Cases only displayed where location can be determined 262 
at the scale of this map. Other cases not indicated. Boundaries are subject to confirmation and locations are 263 
approximate. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the 264 
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status 265 
of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or 266 
boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet 267 
be full agreement.  268 
  269 
Figure 5: Frequency distribution of the most common symptoms reported for confirmed and probable Ebola 270 
virus disease cases, Democratic Republic of Congo, data as of 30 May 2018. Bars denote binomial 95% 271 
confidence interval. Additional symptoms reported in less than 25% of cases not shown.   272 
 273 
Figure 6: Simple linear regressions showing the delay from illness onset to first reported hospitalization (n=16) 274 
and sample testing (n=30), and hospitalization to sample testing (n=12), confirmed and probable Ebola virus 275 
disease cases with date of onset after 30 April, Democratic Republic of the Congo, data as of 30 May 2018. 276 
Points: case observation; line: linear model mean predicted value; shaded area: 95% confidence interval around 277 
the mean.  278 
279 
  280 
Table 2: Exposures prior to onset of illness reported for confirmed and probable Ebola virus disease cases, 281 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, data as of 30 May 2018. 282 
 Proportion of cases reporting exposure:  
Exposure Confirmed Probable Total 
Contact with other cases/sick persons in month before illness  22/31 (71%) 7/10 (70%) 29/41 (71%) 
Funeral participant 18/31 (58%) 6/9 (67%) 24/40 (60%) 
Travel outside of home village/town 11/27 (41%) 1/8 (13%) 12/35 (34%) 
Prior hospitalization 11/28 (39%) 2/7 (29%) 13/35 (37%) 
Visited traditional healer 2/26 (8%) 1/7 (14%) 3/33 (9%) 
Direct contact with animals/raw meat 1/21 5(%) 0/5 (0%) 1/26 (4%) 
*Missing and inconclusive responses excluded.   
 283 
 284 
Figure 7: Observed and projected cumulative incidence of illness onset, over time, using a (A) homogeneous 285 
transmissibility (Poisson) model and a (B) heterogeneous transmissibility (negative binomial) model. The black 286 
solid lines show the observed cumulative incidence of confirmed cases over time. The blue dashed line shows 287 
the mean projected cumulative incidence and the shaded area the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the projected 288 
cumulative incidence. The vertical dotted lines delineate the trusted period. 289 
  290 
Annex 1:  Supplemental information about reproduction number estimates, case projections 291 
Case Fatality Ratio (CFR) 292 
The line list dataset received 1 June 2018 includes three variables relevant to the case fatality ratio (CFR): i) 293 
status at time information was collected; status as time of notification; and; final status.  For status at time of 294 
collection, there were 29 “Alive” and 21 “Dead”; for status at time of notification, there were 23 “Alive”, 25 295 
“Dead” and 2 “NA”; and for final status, there were 6 “Alive”, 13 “Dead” and 31 “NA”.  Of the 18 possible 296 
combinations of these levels, there were 6 combinations observed (as presented in Table A1).  297 
Table A1. The number of confirmed and probable cases by status at time information was collected, status at time of 298 
notification, and final status.   299 
Status at time 
information was 
collected 
Status at time of 
notification 
Final status Number Status 
used in 
current 
analyses 
Alive Alive Alive 6 Alive 
Alive Alive NA 17 Alive 
Alive Dead Dead 4 Dead 
Alive NA NA 2 Alive 
Dead Dead Dead 9 Dead 
Dead Dead NA 12 Dead 
 300 
On the basis of these variables, we conclude that there were 25 deaths and 25 people alive up to 30 May 2018 301 
(the most recent date variable recorded in the variables: date of illness onset, date of hospitalisation, date of 302 
notification, and date of death). 303 
We calculated the expected individual-level probability of having observed death by 30 May 2018, among those 304 
that would eventually die over the course of their illness based on the estimated gamma distribution fitted to 305 
the onset-to-death observations among confirmed and probable cases in the West African Ebola epidemic 306 
(shape = 1.651 and rate = 0.202 giving a mean and standard deviation of 8.17 days and 6.36 days, respectively.5 307 
The average probability was 0.900.  Thus, we take the observed CFR by 30 May 2018 and its exact 95% binomial 308 
confidence interval: 50% (95% CI: 36% - 64%) and obtain the adjusted CFR by dividing each of these numbers by 309 
0.900 to obtain an estimate of CFR adjusted for censoring of 56% (95% CI: 39% - 72%), ignoring uncertainty in 310 
the illness-onset-to-death distribution. 311 
We estimated individual-level CFRs based on age (which was recorded in years for 49 of the 50 cases) using the 312 
equation: 313 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) = exp(− 0.0350 −  0.0820 age. child +  0.0288 age. adult) 1 +  exp(− 0.0350 −  0.0820 age. child +  0.0288 age. adult)  314 
where age.child = min(age – 15, 0) and age.adult = max(age – 15, 0) 315 
where the parametric form and parameter estimates were estimated from data on confirmed and probable 316 
cases during the 2014-16 West African epidemic12 (Figure A1). Note that the average individual-level CFR (66.1%) 317 
observed in the database was assumed for the single case without recorded age.  The mean of these individual 318 
CFRs did not vary substantially between those that were recorded as having died (67.7%) and those still alive 319 
(64.5%).   320 
The expected individual-level probability of death by 30 May 2018 is the product of the estimated individual-321 
level CFR and the estimated individual-level probability of having observed death by 30 May 2018, among those 322 
that would eventually die over the course of their illness. The mean of these individual probabilities of having 323 
observed death by 30 May 2018 varied substantially between those that died (65.9%) and those still alive 324 
(53.7%). Summing these probabilities over all 50 cases in the case database, we find that we would have 325 
expected 29.9 deaths by 30 May 2018 out of a total of 33.0 deaths expected among these 50 confirmed and 326 
probable cases over the course of their illness. Thus, the fatality data observed from the current outbreak are 327 
consistent with what are predicted based on the West African Ebola epidemic (p-value = 0.427). 328 
 329 
 330 
Figure A1. The estimated mean case fatality ratio (CFR %) as a function of age (in years) as estimated for confirmed and 331 
probable cases in ref 2412. The line shows the mean and the shaded area the 95% prediction interval. Data are shown 332 
with 95% confidence interval by age group, by country and overall. 333 
Key Delays 334 
We investigated the delays between the dates of illness onset and death and notification, respectively, and 335 
fitted gamma distributions to the observed delays using maximum likelihood. One case had a negative onset to 336 
notification delay recorded and was removed from the analysis. The summary statistics of the observed delays 337 
are shown alongside the equivalent estimates from the fitted gamma distributions and the distributions’ 338 
parameters with 95% confidence intervals. The observed and fitted values match very well for both fitted 339 
distributions.  340 
Table A2. Summary statistics of mean delays and parameters of the fitted gamma distributions. 341 
  observed fitted 
Onset to  n mean sd mean (95% CI) sd (95% CI) shape (95% rate (95% CI) 
(range) CI) 
     death 14 9.3 (2 - 27) 7.2 9.3 (6.6 - 13.6) 6 (4 - 11) 2.4 (1.1 - 4.5) 0.3 (0.1 - 0.5) 
     
notification 49 10 (0 - 38) 10.4 10 (7.6 - 13.7) 10.4 (7.6 - 15.2) 0.9 (0 - 1.3) 0.1 (0.1 - 0.1) 
 342 
Defining the trusted period 343 
Although the earliest case illness onset was 5 April, the first case notification for a confirmed case was not until 5 344 
May. As a result, the cases with the earliest illness onset have the longest illness-onset-to-notification delays. 345 
We must remain cautious until this delay distribution has stabilized. However, the short illness-onset-to-346 
notification delays observed for the most recent illness onset cases suggests that we could generally expect 347 
short delays for cases with illness onset dates in the recent past and into the near future. We base all following 348 
analyses in this section on the confirmed cases only. 349 
The linear relationship between illness-onset-to-notification delay and date of illness onset among confirmed 350 
cases is shown in Figure A2. A linear regression model fitted to data with dates of illness onset from 30 April 351 
onwards showed that date of illness onset explained 33% of the variation in the illness onset-to-notification 352 
delay. 353 
 354 
Figure A2: A) Dates of notification and illness onset. B) Delay from illness onset to notification against 355 
date of illness onset 356 
 357 
The regression model fitted to these data implies that for cases with illness onset on day 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜, the mean delay to 358 
notification is given by 𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−𝑜𝑜 = 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 + 𝑏𝑏, where 𝑎𝑎 = −0.23 and 𝑏𝑏 = 4149.57 (given in days since 1 January 359 
1970) are the slope and intercept of the linear model fitted above, respectively. Hence the expected date of 360 
notification 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 for a case with illness onset on day 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 is 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 + 𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−𝑜𝑜, with the actual values being normally 361 
distributed around this mean, with a standard deviation defined by the residual standard error of the regression, 362 
𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑=2.42. The simple regression fitted to the confirmed cases appears a good description of the data, implying 363 
that the variance of this normal distribution is independent of the illness onset date. This means that we would 364 
expect 𝑥𝑥% of cases with illness onset on 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 to have been reported by day 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛,𝑥𝑥 = 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 + 𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−𝑜𝑜(𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜) + 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥, where 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥  365 
is the inverse cumulative distribution of the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑=2.42. 366 
Substituting 𝛥𝛥𝑛𝑛−𝑜𝑜, we can resolve this to give the critical illness onset date as 367 
𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥 − 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 + 1  . 368 
 369 
This estimated linear relationship allows us to estimate what proportion of the cases which experienced illness 370 
onset on a particular date (from 30 April onwards) have already been included in the dataset. On this basis we 371 
estimate that 90% of cases with illness onset on 25 May will have been included and 95% of those with illness 372 
onset on 24 May will have been included. Note: The latest date of any sort included in the analysed dataset was 373 
30 May. Thus, having estimated that the recorded incidence of cases with dates of illness onset between 30 374 
April and 24 May (inclusive) were at least 95% complete (potentially relative to an unknown but constant level 375 
of overall under-reporting), we consider this interval to be our ‘trusted period’ from the point of view of 376 
estimating incidence trends, and thereby predicting future incidence, for confirmed cases (Figure 1 main text). 377 
Estimating the Reproduction Number R 378 
We use an approach similar to those previously described13,6 to quantify transmissibility from the incidence time 379 
series during the trusted period of the current epidemic, assuming a certain distribution for the serial interval 380 
(the time between illness onset in a case and illness onset in their infector). Here, we assumed the serial interval 381 
distribution inferred for the West African Ebola epidemic,6, namely a gamma distributed serial interval with 382 
mean 15.3 days and standard deviation 9.1 days.  383 
The distribution of the serial interval used in our analyses is shown in Figure A3.  384 
 385 
Figure A3: Distribution of the serial interval (the time between illness onset in a case and illness onset in their infector), 386 
assuming a gamma distributed serial interval with mean 15.3 days and standard deviation 9.1 days, as estimated during 387 
the West African Ebola epidemic6.  388 
We assumed that transmissibility was constant throughout the trusted period, and estimated the reproduction 389 
number, R, defined as the average number of secondary cases infected by an infected individual. The estimate 390 
of R is informative as if R is above the threshold value 1, and remains above 1, the outbreak is likely to grow 391 
further, whereas if R is below 1, and remains below 1, the outbreak will die out. 392 
Given uncertainty surrounding the epidemiological situation before the trusted period, we only used incidence 393 
data during the trusted period, and reconstructed the incidence before the trusted period whilst estimating R11. 394 
Our method assumes that the daily incidence can be approximated by a Poisson process using the so-called 395 
renewal equation: 396 
 397 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡~𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠=1 ) (1) 398 
where It is the incidence on day t, Rt is the reproduction number on day t, and w is the probability mass function 399 
of the serial interval.  400 
Sensitivity analyses 401 
Sensitivity analyses were performed  402 
- using an alternative distribution of the serial interval, with mean 16.1 days and standard deviation 4.4 403 
days as estimated during a previous Ebola outbreak in DRC26. 404 
- Changing the end of the trusted period, bringing it forward or backward by one day. 405 
- Changing the start of the trusted period, to keep only a week-long trusted period. 406 
 407 
The estimates of R obtained in sensitivity analyses were: 408 
Sensitivity analysis 
Median R 
estimate 
95% Credible 
Interval 
Main analysis 1.03 0.829-1.37 
R estimated over trusted period minus 1 day 1.05 0.834-1.41 
R estimated over trusted period plus 1 day 1.01 0.817-1.3 
R estimated over last week of trusted period 1.03 0.786-1.62 
Alternative serial interval distribution from a previous outbreak in 
DRC 
1.03 0.818-1.41 
 409 
Forward Projections 410 
We used the renewal equation (equation 1) to project the incidence forward, given a back-calculated early 411 
incidence curve, an estimated reproduction number, and the observed incidence over the trusted period. We 412 
sampled 200 sets of back-calculated early incidence curves and reproduction numbers from the posterior 413 
distribution obtained in the estimation process. For each of these sets, we simulated 2000 stochastic realisations 414 
of the renewal equation starting from the end of the trusted period; leading to a total of 400,000 projected 415 
incidence trajectories.  416 
Projections were made on a 4-week horizon (25 May to 21 June). The projections assume that the 417 
transmissibility remains constant over this 4-week horizon. If transmissibility were to decrease as a result of 418 
additional control interventions and/or changes in behaviour over this time period, we would predict a lower 419 
number of cases; similarly, if transmissibility were to increase over this time period, we would predict a higher 420 
number of cases. We limited our projection to 4 weeks only as assuming constant transmissibility over longer 421 
time horizons seemed unrealistic.  422 
Super-spreading has been shown to be an important characteristics of Ebola transmission27. To account for this 423 
characteristic, we considered an alternative projection method, assuming that secondary cases are generated 424 
according to a negative binomial distribution:  425 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡~NegBin�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠, 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠=1
� 426 
The value of the overdispersion parameter, z, was taken from analyses of exposure patterns during the West 427 
African Ebola epidemic27.  428 
Figure A4 shows the 4-week projected daily incidence and cumulative incidence from the end of the trusted 429 
period (25 May to 21 June). 430 
 431 
Figure A4: Observed and projected incidence (A-B) and cumulative incidence (C-D) of illness onset, over time, 432 
using the homogeneous transmissibility (or Poisson) model (A, C) and the heterogeneous transmissibility (or 433 
negative binomial) model (B, D). The black solid lines show the observed incidence of confirmed cases over 434 
time. The blue dashed lines show the mean and the shaded area the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the 435 
projected incidence. The vertical dotted lines show the trusted period. Note the y-axis scale on panels A and B 436 
differ to that of panels C and D.  437 
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